Roll Call, Volume 9, Issue 3, Winter 2023, Newsletter of the Friends of the New Brunswick Military History Museum (FNBMHM)

ROLL CALL

NEWSLETTER OF THE FRIENDS OF THE NEW BRUNSWICK MILITARY HISTORY MUSEUM

AMIS/AMIES DE MUSEÉ D’HISTOIRE MILITAIRE DUNOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK

Volume 9, Issue 3                                                                      Winter 2023

Roll Call is published four times a year: Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter. This issue is the second of 2023. More will follow as the Friends grow. Submissions or comments can be sent to the Editor, Hal Skaarup at hskaarup@rogers.com. For details on joining the Friends, please contact the Museum at 506-422-1304 or email us at: friendsnbmhm@gmail.com.

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Friends of the New Brunswick Military History Museum Executive:

President-Brian MacDonald

Vice-President- Hal Skaarup

Secretary- Doug Hall

Treasurer-Randall Haslett

Directors- Paul Belliveau, Gary Campbell, Robert Dallison, Brent Wilson, and Harold Wright

Fredericton Region Museum’s two Palliser conversion 32-pounderMuzzleloading Rifles

The City of Fredericton, New Brunswick has sand blasted and cleaned up the two cannon that have stood in front of the Fredericton Region Museum since 1947. This made it possible to read the serial numbers and weight information that had been nearly invisible under many previous coats of paint!

Cast Iron64-pounder 71-cwt Muzzleloading Rifle (MLR) with a Dundas or Millar pattern breeching ring, Palliser conversion from a 32-pounder 58-cwt smoothbore muzzle-loading (SBML) Gun to a rifled muzzle-loading (RML) 32-pounder Gun,Queen Victoria cypher, broad arrow, Royal Gun Factory (RGF), (Serial No. 672)with an I ,over possibly a corroded 1856 on the left trunnion, blank on theright trunnion, weight 59-0 (6,608 lbs). RGF IRON on the muzzle. No. 1 of 2that will stand again in Officer’s Square, facing the lighthouse on the SaintJohn River, opposite the York-Sunbury historical Society, Fredericton RegionMuseum. This gun came from Halifax ca. 1947. It has been sanded and repaintedfor preservation with the City of Fredericton Operations Department.

Cast Iron64-pounder 71-cwt Muzzleloading Rifle (MLR) with a Dundas or Millar patternbreeching ring, Palliser conversion from a 32-pounder 58-cwt smoothboremuzzle-loading (SBML) Gun to a rifled muzzle-loading (RML) 32-pounder Gun,Queen Victoria cypher, broad arrow, Royal Gun Factory (RGF), (Serial No. 308)with an I ,over possibly a corroded 1856 on the left trunnion, blank on theright trunnion, weight 58-0 (6,596 lbs). RGF IRON on the muzzle. No. 2 of 2that will stand again in Officer’s Square, facing the lighthouse on the SaintJohn River, opposite the York-Sunbury historical Society, Fredericton RegionMuseum. This gun came from Halifax ca. 1947. It has been sanded and repaintedfor preservation with the City of Fredericton Operations Department.

Many thanksto Karen Daigle, Greg McCann and Tim for helping to save our history!

FrederictonRegion Museum’s two Palliser conversion 64-pounder Muzzleloading Rifles

Thecast-iron 32-pounder smoothbore muzzleloading (SBML) gun was the standardbroadside gun on ships of the line of Royal Navy battle ships in the 18th and19thcentury. The most common of these guns found in Canada are the weaponsdesigned by Thomas Blomefield in the late 1780s or 1790s. Made by the Walker& Company of Rotherham, Yorkshire, England, and Carron of Falkirk,Scotland, these were excellent guns. The development of armour-platedsteamships, however, meant that there was a need for heavier, longer-rangingweapons to be mounted in shore batteries and on warships. Lieutenant-ColonelWilliam Dundas, who was Britain’s Inspector of Artillery from 1839 to 1852,designed two new 32-pounders which were part of the new armament accepted intoBritain’s naval service.

WhenBritain adopted rifled ordnance in the 1860s it still had large stocks ofserviceable but now obsolete smoothbore guns. Gun barrels were expensive tomanufacture, so the best and most recent models were selected for conversion torifled guns, for use as second-line ordnance, using a technique designed byMajor William Palliser. The Palliser conversion was based on what was acceptedas a sound principle that the strongest material in the barrel constructionshould be innermost, and hence a new tube of stronger wrought iron was insertedin the old cast iron barrel, rather than attempting to reinforce the old barrelfrom the outside.

This gunwas based on the cast-iron barrel of the Millar Pattern 8-inch 65 cwt gun,originally designed in 1834. This gun was designed to fire a smooth borespherical shell weighing 50 pounds. The 8-inch gun was bored out to 10.5 inchesand a new built-up wrought iron inner tube with an inner diameter of 6.29inches was inserted and fastened in place. The gun was then rifled with 3grooves, with a uniform twist of 1 turn in 40 calibres (i.e. 1 turn in 252inches), and proof fired. The proof firing also served to expand the new tubeslightly and ensure a tight fit in the old iron tube.

Theserifled guns were initially issued for Sea Service (SS), but by 1886 wereobsolete in that role and were being returned to store for re-issue for LandService (LS). In Naval service they were deployed on many smaller Britishcruising warships around the world.

In Landservice many were mounted for coast defence in both British and coloniallocations. They were mounted on a wide variety of iron and wooden carriages.They became obsolete for coast artillery use in 1902, whereupon most of themwere scrapped and disposed of.

A Cast Iron64-pounder 71-cwt Muzzleloading Rifle (MLR) with a Dundas or Millar patternbreeching ring, Palliser conversion from a 32-pounder 58-cwt SBML, weighed over6,400lbs. Most had been cast as 32-pounders between 1853 and 1856. The Pallisermodification with the guns being re-bored to 64-pounder, took place between1868 and 1871.

(Author Photos)

Cast Iron 64-ponder 71-cwt Muzzleloading Rifle (MLR) with a Dundas or Millar pattern breeching ring, Palliser conversion from a 32-pounder 58-cwt smoothbore muzzle-loading (SBML) Gun to a rifled muzzle-loading (RML) 32-pounder Gun, Queen Victoria cypher, broad arrow, Royal Gun Factory (RGF), (Serial No. 672)with an I ,over possibly a corroded 1856 on the left trunnion, blank on the right trunnion, weight 59-0 (6,608 lbs). RGF IRON on the muzzle. No. 1 of 2that will stand again in Officer’s Square, facing the lighthouse on the Saint John River, opposite the York-Sunbury historical Society, Fredericton Region Museum. This gun came from Halifax ca. 1947. It has been sanded and repaintedfor preservation with the City of Fredericton Operations Department.

(Author Photos)

Cast Iron64-pounder 71-cwt Muzzleloading Rifle (MLR) with a Dundas or Millar pattern breeching ring, Palliser conversion from a 32-pounder 58-cwt smoothbore muzzle-loading (SBML) Gun to a rifled muzzle-loading (RML) 32-pounder Gun, Queen Victoria cypher, broad arrow, Royal Gun Factory (RGF), (Serial No. 308)with an I ,over possibly a corroded 1856 on the left trunnion, blank on the right trunnion, weight 58-0 (6,596 lbs). RGF IRON on the muzzle. No. 2 of 2that will stand again in Officer’s Square, facing the lighthouse on the Saint John River, opposite the York-Sunbury historical Society, Fredericton Region Museum. This gun came from Halifax ca. 1947. It has been sanded and repainted for preservation with the City of Fredericton Operations Department.

‍Canada and UN Peacekeeping

As a founding member of the United Nations, Canada is committed to the guidance provided in the UN Charter to maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations, and to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights.

United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea 1947–49

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Middle East 1948–

United Nations Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan 1949–

United Nations Emergency Force, Suez Crisis. Canadian Armed Forces members took part in the United Nations (UN) peace missions in the Gaza strip and the Sinai peninsula of Egypt between 1956 and 1967, and again from 1973 to 1979. Since 1986, Canadians have also participated in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) peace mission in Egypt. 1956–1967

United Nations Operation in the Congo 1960–1964

United Nations Temporary Executive Authority/United Nations Security Force(West New Guinea, Indonesia) 1962–1963

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 1964–present

United Nations Emergency Force, Middle East 1973–1979

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force(Israel/Syria) 1974–

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 1978 Multinational Force and Observers (Sinai, Egypt) 1981–

United Nations Transition Assistance Group(Namibia) 1989–1990

Persian Gulf War and securing peace in the region after the war. 4,000+ Canadian Armed Forces members served in the region as part of the international Coalition. 1990-1991

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 1991–1994

United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia Canada’s mission to help stabilize and rebuild Cambodia during four peace support missions from 1954 to 2000. 1992–1993

United Nations Operation in Somalia I April 1992 – December 1992

Unified Task Force (Somalia) December 1992 – May 1993

United Nations Protection Force(Croatia) 1992–1995

United Nations Operation in Somalia II May 1993 – March 1995

United Nations Mission in Haiti 1993–1996 United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 1993–1996

United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (Croatia) 1994–1996

United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (North Macedonia) 1995–1999

United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995–2000

United Nations Support Mission in Haiti 1996–1997

United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti 1997–2004

United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti 1997–2000

United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic 1998–2000

International Force for East Timor 1999–2000

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 1999–2002

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 1999–2005

United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 1999–

United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 2000–2002

UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea 2000 Canada’s peacemaking operations in Afghanistan. 2001-2014

UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti 2004

United Nations Mission in Sudan 2005–2009

African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur 2009–

United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. Canada deployed an Air Task Force (ATF) of helicopters to MINUSMA for a period of one year. Known as Operation PRESENCE- Mali (from August 2018 to August 2019) the ATF provided critical medical evacuation, logistics and transportation capability to the United Nations out of Gao, northern Mali. 2018-

Maj Hal Skaarup and Sgt Chris Free beside the wreckage of a BVP-M-80 APC north of Dubrovnik.

1997, Safe Roads, Bosnia-Herzegovina Observations

The collection of information in the field of duty is important because many lives depend on it, more so now than at any time since the Second World War.  A great leader once said, “I would trade all the sophisticated Intelligence collection apparatus available for one good spy in the enemy camp.”  Machines can’t read minds and get into the psyche of the person or group that potentially poses a threat.  More importantly, the threat to one man or group of people may not be of concern to another.  The best way to illustrate this is by describing an experience that members of our Canadian National Intelligence Centre (CANIC) team had in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1997.

One of the constant factors about being on duty in a country that has been at war is the concern with the safety of the routes one must take to get from point A to point B. In order to determine which roads were safe and which were not, we did our best to find and make use of at least five reliable sources of information to confirm the best route to take.  The“HUMINT“ method of Intelligence gathering often involved sitting down with people from different countries in a one on one basis and having a cup of coffee with them.

On more than one occasion we would be asked ifa particular route was safe, most often by someone who was about to take a convoy from point A to B along that route. We would brief the people requesting the information that we would do what we could to find out, and in this particular instance, I began the process by visiting the commander of a middle-eastern contingent, whose area the route went through.  The Muslim commander insisted on having a cup of coffee (you may know the kind I mean; it seems like it consists of 50% thick sludge, and 50% raw caffeine, and with one sip your eyeballs are “THIS BIG” for three days). When I asked the question about whether the route being considered was safe, he responded by asking about what the weather had been like.  My first impression was that he was trying to change the subject, but after a chat about family, our tour of duty in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the situation in general, we eventually came back to discussing the subject of the safety of specific routes.  

He explained that the types of mines that were in use by the local belligerents weren’t usually laid under the pavement of the roadways because it was impractical to do so. However, because the most common type of land mine in use in the area was an anti-personnel mine about the size of a hockey puck, that could easily be planted in the dirt banks on the high side of the road.  When it rains heavily, as it often does in the mountains at the time of year we were concerned with, the mud washes down onto the road, bringing the mines along with it. This meant that if the weather had been bad for the past few days, the road was unlikely to be safe.  Even if you weren’t on a foot patrol, hitting one of these anti-personnel mines with a soft-skinned vehicle could cause you to blow off a tire on a particularly nasty stretch of steep mountain road, and of course, the mine would be sited to ensure there was a long drop off on the opposite side of the road.  If the weather had been good for more than a week and others had travelled on the road in the same period, the odds were relatively good that the road was comparatively safe to take.  On the other hand, the Muslim commander did point out and recommend the use of a longer although somewhat more difficult route that was used by his troops to travel from point A to B all the time.

I then visited with the commander of a European Unit to get his opinion of the route in question.  He was of an Orthodox religion, and they don’t often share their views with other contingents, let alone the Muslims.  However, with the ever present (one might say absolutely necessary) cup of very strong coffee in hand, he listened to my question attentively, and then asked me if there were any Dutchmen in the convoy.  I responded yes, the ambulance crew was from the Netherlands.  He suggested that this might pose a problem, because a number of Bosnia-Herzegovina “war heroes” had been arrested and taken from a particular village along the route. These individuals had then been sent to “The Hague” in the Netherlands and were presently standing trial as a “war criminals.”  If the local villagers happened to see the Dutch vehicle, they would stone the convoy at the very least.  He recommended a detour through another specific route, which interestingly enough was the same route the Muslim commander recommended.

I then visited the commander of a North European nation and asked him the same question about the safety of the route in question.  He in turn warned me that one of the vehicles from the country mounting the convoy had accidentally backed over a small car in another village near the route chosen, a few weeks ago, and in the process injured a woman and her child.  He strongly recommended that another route be taken if they didn’t want to have a hostile encounter.  

Word passes quickly on the military“grapevine,” so most of us were well aware of incidents involving Troops from another country we worked with that were new to the business of keeping the peace in Europe, (and we were part of a group of 39 different nations in the Peace Stabilization Force known as SFOR).  One or two of these “newbies” had severely strained their relations with the local people along the route by dumping garbage anywhere they felt like it, which is not a common thing in Europe.  I would have recommended against anyone taking a convoy through a route where the locals were inordinately hostile to members of contingents who had made themselves unwelcome in their area.  No one needs unnecessary grief.  There were also other so-called allies whose off-duty activities in the black-market made them unwelcome in certain sectors.  One Eastern-based SFOR group had a few representatives who took up the practice of charging “tolls” to local vehicles transiting past their camp. Members of this particularly enterprising group took to shooting at passing local vehicles when they didn’t pay the tolls.  This is not the kind of activity that will endear you to the people you are supposedly there to protect.

This still left a good number of other nations to consult, and as mentioned, I usually liked to check in with five or more for good measure.  The lead liaison officer of another contingent that I visited to gather information about the route indicated to me in no uncertain terms after I asked the question, that, “of course the route was safe.”  I asked him how he knew this to be so, in light of the information I received from other solid sources that indicated otherwise, and his response was, “because our state department says so.”  I did not find that kind of qualification to be very reassuring, particularly when it was highly likely that I might have to make use of the route myself.  Based on the simple interactive discussions with the representatives of the other nations I’ve just described, I would have to get down to “brass tacks” and ask key questions, such as: “Would you want to travel up an uncertain route just on the say so of any one particular country, particularly if they do not have “eyes on the ground?”  For that matter, do you specifically distrust the word of colleagues and observers who seem to know more about the route than you do?”  I think not.

Eventually,I connected with a group of like-minded people from many of the 39 different countries involved in the mission, not necessarily the same ones each time because people, contingents and routes change. My Intelligence team would then compile a list of the routes that were assessed as safe to take, and we would advise allied contingents whose representatives would in turn advise their convoy commanders accordingly.  Quite often the safety of a number of these routes was not in accord or agreement with the assessments provided by state departments of other nations.  However,our Intelligence Section had a more than reasonable degree of certainty as to where it was safe to drive and where it was not.  It was a formula that worked well for us, and I felt that it might have applications elsewhere.

The bottom line about information gathering is,if it involves the safety of my life and yours, I want to know for sure thatany route we may have to travel on is safe, before we let a convoy go anywhereover there, wherever “over there” may be. That principle has to be applied to any of the numerous deployment sitessuch as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Rwanda, the Golan Heights, the Democratic Republic of Congo and other areas our government is arranging to send us.  As you can see, information gathering from as many sources as possible is worth its weight in lives.  All-source Intelligence specifically includes the “HUMINT“ factor. Radar and Satellite imaging in conjunction with electronic and communications Intelligence are only a few of the current examples of very necessary tools in our information-gathering toolbox.  It is, however, equally necessary to be speaking with the people on ground in the location of interest, and specifically with someone who has been there and knows what he is talking about, before assuming the risk of sending someone along a route he might not come back from.  In the end, if you can’t get the information with technology, you may have to go and look for yourself.  A very old military rule is that time spent on reconnaissance is seldom wasted – even if it is rarely recovered.

The essential ingredient in the business of information gathering in the kind of environment one finds oneself in while on duty in places like Bosnia-Herzegovina is the need for continuous human interaction with all of our allies.  A great deal of patience and the ability to engage people in a meaningful dialogue with practical social skills are necessary elements in the business of information gathering.  The ability to work with the disgruntled is necessary when dealing with more than just the obvious belligerents.  One learns quickly that there are representatives from more than a few theoretically “friendly” countries, who seem to go out of their way to make themselves unwelcome with an attitude of “We are here to sort you out and you had better be grateful or else.”  By example, I have seen representatives from Country A treat everyone like dirt and so no one wants to deal with him or her.  The representative from Country B doesn’t seem to speak English in a form that anyone else can understand (no names, no pack drill here please).  The crew from Country C seems to take a “religious” view on every task it is assigned.  Country D has to put a political spin on things.  Country E is only there for the money, black-market and otherwise.  Some countries actually want to make adifference – and in that, we are almost unique.

The only way to make that difference is to educate the people who send us on these missions about what the environment is like in the theatre we are going into, and what is reasonably possible to accomplish once we get there.  It is very important to know what the exit strategy is before we go in.  The Intelligence team has to be in the loop from the commander’s direction downwards, on what constitutes the “mission accomplished” End State.  Soldiers understand why you need information and what to do with it on the ground (and the more you have in advance, the better), but one is left with the impression that sometimes, the politicians that put us in these places are slightly “less well-informed,” on the risks we are exposed to, to put it in politically correct terminology.  

Our job is to gather information about those who pose the threat to the troops on the ground and get it to them in a timely and useful manner.  Those we work for need to instruct our political masters on the important (and potentially life-threatening) aspects that they need to know about the situation they intend to put us in and why it is the way it is.  As we continue to deploy on dangerous missions to unstable and highly volatile nations, (within the classic “three-block war” scenario now part of Army doctrine),  we need to be better prepared with people who know how to gather the information and get it to those who need to make the best use of it.  It has never been more important.

There is a great need in our service for people with language training, overseas experience, and human interactive social skills who can be employed to conduct long-term interactive liaison and intercourse with target nations.  A number of our members have excellent skills, such as having an Interrogation course qualification.  Attendance on Kinesiology courses can be useful as well (this is the business of studying a person’s face and body language to read whether or not they are telling the truth).

Traditional Intelligence briefing and debriefing of patrols is still necessary. Making direct personal contact with our Intelligence counterparts in theatre on a continuous basis is absolutely necessary.  It involves a degree of “showing the flag” but also lets others know we are there to get the job done and to make a difference, by building trust.  Being inside the “grapevine” or Community information loop can also be useful in increasing one’s sense of well being and can reduce the chances of being on thereceiving end of unwelcome surprises. These activities have always been a necessary part of our world, although they are not always applied universally across the board.  The best preparation for conducting operations involving information gathering in the field is good solid basic Army training.  The most important ingredient for success is the use of common sense based on practical experience, something our Intelligence personnel have a great deal of, as I have been privileged to observe in the field.

The bottom line is this: don’t accept everything you hear as being absolutely true, make use of all sources, be discerning, and most importantly think for yourself.  If you are not going to do that, then stay out of it.  Sometimes when things are at their darkest, you have to be the light, and that is essentially what this report is about – the right people being in the right place at the right time, so that the rest of us can sleep soundly at night.  E Tenebris Lux.

Major (Retired) Harold A. Skaarup

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